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This paper examines the stock market reaction to banks that lobby relative to banks that did not 
lobby in the period around the November 9, 2016 U.S. presidential election. Using three different 
methods of event studies to calculate the cumulative average return, we find that lobbying in banks 
has a meaningful relationship to an abnormal increase in those firm’s stock prices. Then we attempt 
to control for both the systemic importance and size of these institutions by performing cross-
sectional regressions that include matched size, and the systemic nature of the banks. The results 
suggest that a heavily regulated industry such as banking, can see a noteworthy impact from a 
strong lobbying strategy.  
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I. Introduction 
The Dodd-Frank Act, which was introduced in 2009 by then U.S. President Barack Obama, 
gave additional power to the Federal Reserve to regulate and oversee systemically significant 
institutions, and restrict banks from engaging in proprietary trading. This regulation was 
implemented in response to the 2008 financial crisis, which was arguably the result of regulatory 
oversight. When Donald Trump was announced to be the 45th President-elect in the early morning 
of November 9th, 2016, it came as a surprise to many market participants. President Trump pledged 
as part of his policy platform that he would reduce bank regulations, specifically by replacing the 
Dodd-Frank Act. In fact, Trump’s transition team stated the following: “The Dodd-Frank economy 
does not work… The Financial Services Policy Implementation team will be working to dismantle 
the Dodd-Frank Act and replace it with new policies to encourage economic growth and job 
creation.”1  
The removal of current regulations (e.g., Dodd-Frank) and the addition of new regulations 
is the perfect opportunity to determine lobbying effectiveness. Lobbyists use the connections 
formed by former government officials, bureaucrats, and regulators, to leverage existing 
government entities to change or create laws that might be beneficial to the companies that hire 
them (Ban and You, 2019). Lobbying is a massive monetary industry, with the financial services 
sector being a large contributor. Between 1998 and 2016, the financial sector (finance, insurance, 
and real estate) spent $7.4 billion on lobbying activities (Igan and Lambert, 2019). These 
expenditures dwarf the amount spent on campaign contributions over the same time period, giving 
some tangential evidence that these firms view lobbying as the more effective way to impact the 
high levels of regulation facing the industry. Ban and You (2019) find that over 2,900 
 
1 See the article “Trump transition vows to ‘dismantle’ Dodd-Frank by The Hill at: https://thehill.com/business-a-
lobbying/305441-trump-transition-vows-to-dismantle-dodd-frank. 
organizations engaged in some type of lobbying during the congressional bill stage of the Dodd-
Frank Act. Big banks see lobbying as a vital part of their overall business strategy, with current 
CEO of JP Morgan Chase, Jamie Dimon, having said that it is the company’s “seventh line of 
business.”2  
The purpose of this paper is to determine the effectiveness of lobbying as perceived by 
stock markets. More specifically, we compare the stock prices of banks that lobby (i.e., are 
politically active) against the stock prices of banks that do not lobby around November 9th, 2016, 
which is the first trading day after the announcement of president-elect Trump. The election was 
arguably a surprise to most of the market, as many pollsters had picked Hilary Clinton in a 
landslide vote.3 This provides a clean timeline in which to conduct an event study.3 In particular, 
we can study the effects that a promise of deregulation had on banks that are politically active. We 
believe that banks that are more actively involved in lobbying will have an abnormal return over 
those banks which are not politically active.  
We find that lobbying played an important part in the banks that saw the most growth 
during that time. The financial institutions that were politically active and lobbied during that time 
saw a statistically significant stock price increase above the financial institutions that did not lobby. 
We contribute to the growing literature that examines the effects of banking regulations on stock 
markets. Gao, Liao, and Wang (2018) show that large financial institutions experienced negative 
(positive) abnormal stock (bond) returns around different events associated with the Dodd-Frank 
Act. These results suggest that market participants anticipated a decrease in risk-seeking 
 
2 See New York Times “Obama Aide Declines Visit to Bank Board.” 
3 See https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/2016-election-forecast/national-polls/ 
3 A similar study could be done using the initial introduction of the Dodd-Frank Act, when the Dodd-Frank act was 
introduced by President Obama. The democrat party held majority in both the house and the senate ensuring that the 
bill would be passed, creating an ambiguous timeline as to the specific event date that markets would have reacted, 
making an event study difficult.  
investment behavior by financial firms that would negatively affect the firms’ future cash flows. 
Hachenberg, Kiesel, Kolaric, and Schiereck (2017) show that the stock prices for global 
systemically important banks (GSIBs) increased substantially around the 2016 U.S. presidential 
election, relative to non-GSIB banks. These results are consistent with the notion that stock 
markets expected deregulation of the financial industry that would benefit shareholders. We find 
that whether or not a bank engages in lobbying activities better explains the abnormal returns seen 
in the banking industry around the election than if it is deemed systemically important. Our results 
seem to suggest that stock markets view lobbying as an effective avenue through which to affect 
corporate policy.  
II. Data Description 
The data for our study are obtained from three sources: The Center for Responsive Politics 
(CRP), Compustat, and The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). From the CRP, we obtain 
annual lobbying expenditures for each firm during 2015. From Compustat annual filings on December 31, 
2015, we obtain financial statement information to calculate the following variables: MCAP is the market 
capitalization, or price times shares outstanding; D/E is the debt-to-equity ratio or total liabilities divided 
by total stockholders’ equity; and B/M is the book-to-market ratio or book value per share (total 
stockholders’ equity divided by shares outstanding) divided by the market price. The following trading 
statistics are averages from daily CRSP files from January 2, 2015 to December 31, 2015: Price is the 
average daily closing price. Volume is the average daily share volume. %Spread is the average daily 
difference between the closing ask and bid prices, scaled by the quote midpoint. Rvolt is the average daily 
range-based volatility, or the log of the daily high ask price minus the log of the daily low bid price. We 
are left with a cross-sectional dataset of 449 financial institutions, which are identified as share codes 
between 6000 and 6199.  
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
Table 1 demonstrates that the banks that lobby are among the largest banks with the median 
market cap of 0.0848 (billion) versus a median market cap of 0.0037 (billion) for those banks that 
do not actively lobby. Furthermore, the average stock price for a bank that lobbies is $43.47, while 
it is only $24.88 for bank that do not lobby. From the total of 449 banks in this study, only 18 
engaged in lobbying activities during 2015. Igan and Lambert (2019) explain that very few banks 
can afford to lobby due to the high fixed costs that bar entry to all but the largest banks. These high 
fixed costs are things like the creation of a political action department, creating a coherent strategy, 
building the relationships with the lobbying firms, bureaucrats, and elected officials. The other 
large consideration is that with all these fixed costs a firm will only want to have to pay them one 
time and so they need to be committed to having a presence in politics for a substantial amount of 
time to make the investment worth it. We also show that banks are highly leveraged with average 
D/E ratios between 8.49 (non-lobbying firms) and 8.92 (lobbying firms).  
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 Table 2 is our first look into how these different variables interact, by using a correlation 
matrix. MCAP has a high correlation between the GSIB indicator variable, which is equal to one 
if the bank is considered systemically important and zero otherwise. This gives us an idea that 
there is a connection between size and the designation of a bank as a GSIB. There is also a high 
correlation between MCAP and Lobbying, as Igan and Lambert (2018) point out, only the 
wealthiest of firms can afford the high costs of lobbying.  
III. Empirical Results 
 In this section, we report the results from our empirical analysis. In particular, we use the 
surprise victory of Donald Trump in the 2016 U.S. presidential election as a shock to the ‘expected’ 
regulatory environment in the banking sector. Since the Trump administration was extremely vocal 
about the removal, or complete overhaul, of the Dodd-Frank Act, stock market participants might 
have perceived this deregulation as a buying opportunity into financial institutions’ stocks. 
Furthermore, banks that engaged in lobbying might have been in a better position to help shape 
future regulation, which markets may have perceived as value adding.  
 In our first set of tests, we compare raw cumulative returns for banks that lobbied in 2015 
with those that did not during the same period. We also compare market adjusted returns (MAR), 
which are calculated on day t as follows: 
 𝑀𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 (1) 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the return on bank i on day t and 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the market return either equal-weighted 
(Panel B) or value weighted (Panel C) across CRSP securities on day t. These returns are then 
cumulated (CARs) over various event windows. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 
3. 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
 Over the [-1,+1] event window, we find that the stock prices for banks that lobby increased 
by 10.33% and they increased by 5.20% for banks that do not lobby. These results suggest that the 
stock prices of banks increased generally around the election period. More importantly, we find 
that there is a 5.13% difference in the cumulative returns for banks that lobby, relative to those 
that do not lobby. Similarly, over the [-2,+2] event window, there is a 5.38% difference in 
cumulative returns for banks that lobby, relative to those that do not lobby. Furthermore, during 
the [-5,+5] event window, we see a 5.64% difference in cumulative returns for lobbying banks, 
relative to non-lobbying banks. These differences are not only statistically significant, but they are 
economically meaningful. The results also lend support for our hypothesis that the market values 
lobbying, particularly during time of regulatory uncertainty.   
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
In Table 4, we use the Market Model, which adds more clarity to effects of lobbying versus 
non-lobbying in bank stocks. It does this by controlling the study for the systemic risk that are part 
of the market. We obtain the 𝛽0 and 𝛽1 parameter estimates from the following market model that 
is estimated in the period ending 46 days before the event date (maximum of 255 days and 
minimum of 3 days): 
 𝐸[𝑅𝑖,𝑡] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑚,𝑡, (2) 
where 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the market return either equal-weighted (Panel A) or value weighted (Panel B) across 
CRSP securities on day t. We then estimate the abnormal returns for each stock day during the 
event window as follows: 
 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑖,𝑡], (3) 
 These abnormal returns are then cumulated over various event windows.   
Focusing on the value-weighted model in Panel B of Table 4, we see that during the [-1,+1] 
event window, the difference in cumulative abnormal returns between banks that lobby, relative 
to those that do not lobby, is 4.18%, which is significant at the 0.05 level. We find similar results 
over longer event windows and equal-weighting the market benchmark.   
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
Using the Fama-French four factor model we can control for risk factors that we have not 
yet accounted for in our previous models. We obtain the beta parameter estimates from the 
following four-factor model that is estimated in the period ending 46 days before the event date 
(maximum of 255 days and minimum of 3 days): 
 𝐸[𝑅𝑖,𝑡] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑋𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 , (4) 
where 𝐸𝑋𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 is the market risk premium, the return on the market (either equal-weighted (Panel 
A) or value weighted (Panel B) across CRSP securities on day t) minus the risk-free return. 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 
is the high minus low book-to-market risk factor. SMB is the small minus large market 
capitalization risk factor. UMD is the winners minus losers momentum risk factor. The first two 
risk factors are discussed in Fama and French (1993), while the last is outlined in Carhart (1997).  
We then estimate the abnormal returns for each stock day during the event window using equation 
(2). These abnormal returns are then cumulated over various event windows.  
By controlling for other factors, we can more clearly see the impact of corporate lobbying. 
Concentrating on the value-weighted market index in Panel B of Table 5, we find that over the [-
1,+1] event window, the difference in CARs between banks that lobby and those that do not lobby 
is 3.10%, which is significant at the 0.05 level. Again, we find similar results over different event 
windows that model specifications.    
Based on what we found from the CARs, we can conclude that during our event windows, 
there is an abnormal return on banks that are politically active. Using a cross-sectional regression 
in Table 6, we can determine some of the factors that played a role in these abnormal returns.  We 
do that by running the following cross-sectional regression equation on aggregated stock data as 
of December 31, 2015: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑆𝐼𝐵𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐷/𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐵/𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖
+ 𝛽7𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽8% 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽9𝑅𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑡𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
(5) 
where the dependent variable is the market model cumulative abnormal return around the 
November 9, 2016 U.S. presidential election. Lobby is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
bank lobbied in 2015 and zero if the bank did not lobby in the same calendar year. GSIB is an 
indicator equal to one if the bank is listed as systemically important and zero otherwise. MCAP is 
the market capitalization, or price times shares outstanding. D/E is the debt-to-equity ratio or total 
liabilities divided by total stockholders’ equity. B/M is the book-to-market ratio or book value per 
share (total stockholders’ equity divided by shares outstanding) divided by the price. Price is the 
average daily closing price. Volume is the average daily share volume. %Spread is the average 
daily difference between the closing ask and bid prices, scaled by the quote midpoint. Rvolt is the 
average daily range-based volatility, or the log of the daily high ask price minus the log of the 
daily low bid price. The results of estimating equation (5) are reported in Table 6, with t-statistics 
in parentheses obtained from robust standard errors clustered at the stock level.  
 [Insert Table 6 Here] 
In each of the event windows, we find that the coefficient on the categorical variable, 
Lobby, is positive and significant at the 0.01 level. In economic terms, the results suggest that 
banks that lobbied outperformed banks that did not lobby between 4.37 and 5.87 percentage points 
around the election, depending on the model specification. Interestingly, we find that the 
coefficients on GSIB are generally insignificant, or lower than those on Lobby. These results 
indicate that whether or not a bank lobbied is more important in explaining the election returns 
than if the financial institution is categorized as systemically important.  
 [Insert Table 7 Here] 
Our goal is to fully understand whether the lobbying effort of a firm were the main impact 
in the abnormal returns we saw around the 2016 election. To accomplish this, we create a matched 
sample between banks that lobbied with banks that did not lobby based on market capitalization 
and price. This took our pervious data set of 449 down to a total sample of 36 financial institutions. 
We then reran the same cross-sectional regression equation as above on a sample of banks that 
lobbied during 2015 and a matched sample of banks that did not lobby during the same period. We 
do this in order to find if the systemic importance of the bank or its lobbying activities, are the 
driving factor of the abnormal returns that exist during the event windows. Due to the reduced 
sample size most of the beta coefficients become less statistically significant. We find that even 
with this smaller sample size the Lobby variable has an impact at the 0.10 significance level on 
the [-1,+1] and [-5,+5] event windows, while the GSIB variable is not significant at all in this 
sample. This leads us to believe that the effect of lobbying is more impactful than the systemic 
significance of the banks. 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
The purpose of this study is to examine if lobbying done by banks was perceived as an 
effective strategy by market participants surrounding the 2016 election results. We find that 
lobbying played an important part in the banks that saw the most growth during that time. The 18 
financial institutions that were politically active and lobbied during that time saw a statistically 
significant stock price increase above the financial institutions that did not lobby. 
This could be a strong strategy for both investors and companies to consider. By being 
aware of the companies who are engaged in lobbying they could see excess returns above the 
market any time a new regulation is proposed upon any government regulated industry. Companies 
can capitalize on this by making use of Lobbying, especially firms who operate in heavily regulated 
industries. When firms are seen to be actively involved in the creation of the regulation that 
governs them, the market sees this as a positive event, and values those companies higher than the 
rest of the industry they operate in.  
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
This table reports summary statistics that describe the sample of banks that lobbied in 2015 (Panel A) 
and banks that did not lobby in the same calendar year (Panel B). The following financial statement 
measures are estimated from Compustat as of December 31, 2015: MCAP is the market capitalization, 
or price times shares outstanding. D/E is the debt-to-equity ratio or total liabilities divided by total 
stockholders’ equity. B/M is the book-to-market ratio or book value per share (total stockholders’ equity 
divided by shares outstanding) divided by the price. The following trading statistics are averages from 
daily CRSP files from January 2, 2015 to December 31, 2015: Price is the average daily closing price. 
Volume is the average daily share volume. %Spread is the average daily difference between the closing 
ask and bid prices, scaled by the quote midpoint. Rvolt is the average daily range-based volatility, or the 
log of the daily high ask price minus the log of the daily low bid price.   
Panel A. Banks that lobbied in 2015  
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. p25 Median p75 
MCAP (in $billions) 18 0.3941 0.6912 0.0294 0.0848 0.3330 
D/E 18 8.9248 5.0445 6.2575 7.3951 10.8001 
B/M 18 1.1606 0.6186 0.7619 0.9908 1.3757 
Price 18 43.4701 34.5179 19.8177 34.9453 44.6898 
Volume (in millions) 18 3.8260 4.2202 0.8954 2.3386 4.1810 
% Spread 18 0.0005 0.0003 0.0002 0.0004 0.0007 
Rvolt 18 0.0218 0.0067 0.0168 0.0199 0.0248 
Panel B. Banks that did not lobby in 2015  
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. p25 Median p75 
MCAP (in $billions) 431 0.0591 0.2286 0.0011 0.0037 0.0146 
D/E 431 8.4906 4.3587 6.7105 8.3335 9.7883 
B/M 431 0.8907 0.3742 0.6925 0.8518 1.0286 
Price 431 24.8803 23.1597 12.4373 18.9861 29.6749 
Volume (in millions) 431 0.7272 4.4207 0.0078 0.0395 0.2381 
% Spread 431 0.0098 0.0141 0.0009 0.0026 0.0152 
Rvolt 431 0.0227 0.0089 0.0174 0.0216 0.0247 
 
  
Table 2. Cross-Sectional Correlation Matrix 
This table reports pooled correlation coefficients for the variables used in the cross-sectional analysis. Lobby is an indicator variable equal to one 
if the bank lobbied in 2015 and zero if the bank did not lobby in the same calendar year. GSIB is an indicator variable equal to one if the bank is 
a G-SIB according to the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2015 list, and zero otherwise. The 
following financial statement measures are estimated from Compustat as of December 31, 2015: MCAP is the market capitalization, or price times 
shares outstanding. D/E is the debt-to-equity ratio or total liabilities divided by total stockholders’ equity. B/M is the book-to-market ratio or book 
value per share (total stockholders’ equity divided by shares outstanding) divided by the price. The following trading statistics are averages from 
daily CRSP files from January 2, 2015 to December 31, 2015: Price is the average daily closing price. Volume is the average daily share volume. 
%Spread is the average daily difference between the closing ask and bid prices, scaled by the quote midpoint. Rvolt is the average daily range-
based volatility, or the log of the daily high ask price minus the log of the daily low bid price.   
  Lobby GSIB MCAP D/E B/M Price Volume %Spread Rvolt 
Lobby 1.000 
        
 
         
GSIB 0.123 1.000 
       
 [0.0091] 
        
MCAP 0.244 0.649 1.000 
      
 [<.0001] [<.0001] 
       
D/E 0.019 0.098 0.066 1.000 
     
 [0.681] [0.0385] [0.1657] 
      
B/M 0.136 0.159 0.008 0.121 1.000 
    
 [0.0039] [0.0007] [0.8644] [0.0106] 
     
Price 0.152 0.090 0.250 -0.037 -0.277 1.000 
   
 [0.0012] [0.0555] [<.0001] [0.433] [<.0001] 
    
Volume 0.137 0.505 0.563 -0.019 0.069 0.043 1.000 
  
 [0.0037] [<.0001] [<.0001] [0.6924] [0.1445] [0.3600] 
   
%Spread -0.132 -0.098 -0.171 0.180 0.167 -0.243 -0.121 1.000 
 
 [0.0051] [0.0379] [0.0003] [0.0001] [0.0004] [<.0001] [0.0103] 
  
Rvolt -0.020 -0.117 -0.176 0.136 -0.091 -0.047 -0.057 0.220 1.000 
  [0.6692] [0.0134] [0.0002] [0.0039] [0.0539] [0.3228] [0.2313] [<.0001]   
 
Table 3. Cumulative Raw and Market Adjusted Returns 
Panel A of this table reports raw cumulative returns for banks that lobbied in 2015 and those that did not 
during the same time period around the November 9, 2016 U.S. presidential election. Panels B and C of 
this table reports cumulative market adjusted returns for the same stocks over the same time period. The 
market adjusted return (MAR) on day t is determined as follows:  
𝑀𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the return on stock i on day t and 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the market return either equal-weighted (Panel B) 
or value weighted (Panel C) across CRSP securities on day t. These returns are then cumulated (CARs) 
over various event windows. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
Panel A. Raw Returns 
Event Range Lobby No Lobby Lobby - No Lobby 
[-1, +1] 10.33% 5.20% 5.13%*** 
 (5.74) (20.84) (4.03) 
[-2, +2] 14.74% 9.36% 5.38%*** 
 (8.13) (26.33) (3.03) 
[-5, +5] 15.70% 10.07% 5.64%*** 
 (7.23) (27.32) (3.04) 
Panel B. Equal Weighted Market Adjusted Returns 
Event Range Lobby No Lobby Lobby - No Lobby 
[-1, +1] 7.29% 2.16% 5.13%*** 
 (4.05) (8.67) (4.03) 
[-2, +2] 8.81% 3.43% 5.38%*** 
 (4.86) (9.66) (3.03) 
[-5, +5] 9.80% 4.16% 5.64%*** 
 (4.51) (11.28) (3.04) 
Panel C. Value Weighted Market Adjusted Returns 
  CARs   Differences 
Event Range Lobby No Lobby Lobby - No Lobby 
[-1, +1] 8.42% 3.29% 5.13%*** 
 (4.68) (13.19) (4.03) 
[-2, +2] 10.64% 5.26% 5.38%*** 
 (5.87) (14.80) (3.03) 
[-5, +5] 12.01% 6.37% 5.64%*** 




Table 4. Cumulative Market Model Returns  
This table reports cumulative market model returns for banks that lobbied in 2015 and those that did not 
during the same time period around the November 9, 2016 U.S. presidential election. We obtain the 𝛽0 
and 𝛽1 parameter estimates from the following market model that is estimated in the period ending 46 
days before the event date (maximum of 255 days and minimum of 3 days): 
𝐸[𝑅𝑖,𝑡] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑚,𝑡 
where 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the market return either equal-weighted (Panel A) or value weighted (Panel B) across 
CRSP securities on day t. We then estimate the abnormal returns for each stock day during the event 
window (AR) as follows: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑖,𝑡] 
These abnormal returns are then cumulated (CARs) over various event windows. T-statistics are reported 
in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.    
Panel A. Equal Weighted Market Model Returns 
Event Range Lobby No Lobby Lobby - No Lobby 
[-1, +1] 6.52% 2.95% 3.57%*** 
 (3.70) (12.19) (2.89) 
[-2, +2] 7.24% 5.00% 2.25% 
 (4.41) (14.90) (1.34) 
[-5, +5] 8.60% 5.52% 3.08%* 
 (4.18) (15.67) (1.73) 
Panel B. Value Weighted Market Model Returns 
Event Range Lobby No Lobby Lobby - No Lobby 
[-1, +1] 7.82% 3.65% 4.18%*** 
 (4.30) (15.22) (3.40) 
[-2, +2] 9.27% 6.07% 3.20%** 
 (5.25) (18.49) (1.94) 
[-5, +5] 11.15% 6.89% 4.26%** 




Table 5. Cumulative FF4 Factor Alphas 
This table reports cumulative FF4 factor adjusted alphas for banks that lobbied in 2015 and those that 
did not during the same time period around the November 9, 2016 U.S. presidential election. We obtain 
the beta parameter estimates from the following four-factor model that is estimated in the period ending 
46 days before the event date (maximum of 255 days and minimum of 3 days): 
𝐸[𝑅𝑖,𝑡] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑋𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 
where 𝐸𝑋𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡  is the market risk premium, the return on the market (either equal-weighted (Panel A) 
or value weighted (Panel B) across CRSP securities on day t) minus the risk-free return. 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 is the 
high minus low book-to-market risk factor. SMB is the small minus large market capitalization risk 
factor. UMD is the winners minus losers momentum risk factor. The first two risk factors are discussed 
in Fama and French (1993), while the last is outlined in Carhart (1997). We then estimate the abnormal 
returns for each stock day during the event window (AR) as follows: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑖,𝑡] 
These abnormal returns are then cumulated (CARs) over various event windows. T-statistics are reported 
in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
Panel A. FF4 Alphas Equal Weighted Market Index 
Event Range Lobby No Lobby Lobby - No Lobby 
[-1, +1] 5.26% 1.72% 3.54%*** 
 (4.19) (10.60) (2.80) 
[-2, +2] 6.56% 3.28% 3.28%** 
 (5.16) (14.48) (2.54) 
[-5, +5] 6.21% 2.54% 3.67%** 
 (3.85) (11.14) (2.25) 
Panel B. FF4 Alphas Value Weighted Market Index 
Event Range Lobby No Lobby Lobby - No Lobby 
[-1, +1] 4.22% 1.12% 3.10%** 
 (3.31) (7.65) (2.42) 
[-2, +2] 4.80% 2.25% 2.55%** 
 (3.80) (10.91) (1.99) 
[-5, +5] 4.89% 1.77% 3.12%* 




Table 6. Cross-Sectional Regressions - GSIB 
This table reports the results from estimating specifications of the following cross-sectional regression 
equation on a sample of banks that lobbied during 2015 and a sample of banks that did not lobby during 
the same time period: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑆𝐼𝐵𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐷/𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐵/𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖
+ 𝛽8% 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽9𝑅𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑡𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
where the dependent variable is the market model cumulative abnormal return around the November 9, 
2016 U.S. presidential election. Lobby is an indicator variable equal to one if the bank lobbied in 2015 
and zero if the bank did not lobby in the same calendar year. GSIB is an indicator variable equal to one 
if the bank is a G-SIB according to the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision 2015 list, and zero otherwise. The following financial statement measures are 
estimated from Compustat as of December 31, 2015: MCAP is the market capitalization, or price times 
shares outstanding. D/E is the debt-to-equity ratio or total liabilities divided by total stockholders’ equity. 
B/M is the book-to-market ratio or book value per share (total stockholders’ equity divided by shares 
outstanding) divided by the price. The following trading statistics are averages from daily CRSP files 
from January 2, 2015 to December 31, 2015: Price is the average daily closing price. Volume is the 
average daily share volume. %Spread is the average daily difference between the closing ask and bid 
prices, scaled by the quote midpoint. Rvolt is the average daily range-based volatility, or the log of the 
daily high ask price minus the log of the daily low bid price. T-statistics are reported in parentheses 
obtained from heteroscedastic corrected standard errors. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
  Equal Weighted Value Weighted 
Event Window [-1, +1] [-2, +2] [-5, +5] [-1, +1] [-2, +2] [-5, +5] 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Lobby 0.0483*** 0.0437*** 0.0530*** 0.0513*** 0.0488*** 0.0587*** 
 (2.80) (2.78) (2.69) (2.91) (3.00) (2.92) 
GSIB 0.0438** 0.0485 0.0506 0.0474** 0.0541* 0.0576 
 (2.09) (1.47) (1.40) (2.28) (1.69) (1.65) 
MCAP -0.0508*** -0.0820*** -0.0986*** -0.0500*** -0.0809*** -0.0971*** 
 (-2.66) (-3.36) (-3.73) (-2.67) (-3.46) (-3.83) 
D/E 0.0006 0.0000 0.0005 0.0005 -0.0001 0.0004 
 (0.55) (0.04) (0.32) (0.48) (-0.05) (0.25) 
B/M -0.0275*** -0.0387*** -0.0303** -0.0254*** -0.0350*** -0.0264** 
 (-3.49) (-3.75) (-2.33) (-3.21) (-3.41) (-2.02) 
Price -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (-0.36) (-0.96) (-0.90) (-0.10) (-0.69) (-0.59) 
Volume 0.0011*** 0.0013** 0.0019*** 0.0011*** 0.0013*** 0.0020*** 
 (2.62) (2.46) (3.24) (2.66) (2.63) (3.49) 
% Spread -0.5077** -1.0730*** -1.1267*** -0.6919*** -1.3309*** -1.4930*** 
 (-2.17) (-3.35) (-2.91) (-3.32) (-4.82) (-4.21) 
Rvolt 0.0165 -0.5452 -0.3782 0.4044 0.1275 0.3559 
 (0.04) (-0.99) (-0.65) (1.01) (0.23) (0.60) 
Constant 0.0558*** 0.1130*** 0.1045*** 0.0537*** 0.1077*** 0.1010*** 
 (4.20) (6.12) (4.85) (4.01) (5.80) (4.64) 
R2 0.1022 0.1406 0.1299 0.1265 0.1615 0.1596 




Table 7. Cross-Sectional Regressions – Matched Sample 
This table reports the results from estimating specifications of the following cross-sectional regression 
equation on a sample of banks that lobbied during 2015 and a matched sample of banks that did not lobby 
during the same time period: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑜𝑏𝑏𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑆𝐼𝐵𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐷/𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐵/𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖
+ 𝛽8% 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽9𝑅𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑡𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
where the dependent variable is the market model cumulative abnormal return around the November 9, 
2016 U.S. presidential election. Lobby is an indicator variable equal to one if the bank lobbied in 2015 
and zero for a similar matched bank that did not lobby in the same calendar year. GSIB is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the bank is a G-SIB according to the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2015 list, and zero otherwise. The following financial 
statement measures are estimated from Compustat as of December 31, 2015: MCAP is the market 
capitalization, or price times shares outstanding. D/E is the debt-to-equity ratio or total liabilities divided 
by total stockholders’ equity. B/M is the book-to-market ratio or book value per share (total stockholders’ 
equity divided by shares outstanding) divided by the price. The following trading statistics are averages 
from daily CRSP files from January 2, 2015 to December 31, 2015: Price is the average daily closing 
price. Volume is the average daily share volume. %Spread is the average daily difference between the 
closing ask and bid prices, scaled by the quote midpoint. Rvolt is the average daily range-based volatility, 
or the log of the daily high ask price minus the log of the daily low bid price. T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses obtained from heteroscedastic corrected standard errors. ***, **, * denote statistical 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
  Equal Weighted Value Weighted 
Event Window [-1, +1] [-2, +2] [-5, +5] [-1, +1] [-2, +2] [-5, +5] 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Lobby 0.0489* 0.0349 0.0450* 0.0514* 0.0393 0.0495* 
 (1.73) (1.54) (1.72) (1.76) (1.63) (1.80) 
GSIB 0.0813 0.0828 0.0898 0.0845 0.0881 0.0961 
 (1.17) (1.08) (1.12) (1.19) (1.12) (1.17) 
MCAP -0.0124 -0.0203 -0.0268 -0.0147 -0.0237 -0.0314 
 (-0.35) (-0.51) (-0.64) (-0.41) (-0.58) (-0.74) 
D/E -0.0009 0.0009 0.0008 -0.0008 0.0009 0.0009 
 (-0.23) (0.20) (0.16) (-0.21) (0.22) (0.18) 
B/M -0.0468 -0.0517* -0.0561* -0.0449 -0.0487 -0.0524 
 (-1.50) (-1.83) (-1.87) (-1.41) (-1.67) (-1.70) 
Price -0.0007* -0.0007 -0.0008* -0.0006* -0.0007 -0.0008* 
 (-1.86) (-1.55) (-1.97) (-1.78) (-1.47) (-1.82) 
Volume -0.0022 -0.0014 -0.0024 -0.0021 -0.0013 -0.0022 
 (-0.57) (-0.38) (-0.65) (-0.52) (-0.35) (-0.57) 
% Spread 10.0843 8.6445 4.8932 9.3059 7.5220 3.3515 
 (0.66) (0.62) (0.32) (0.60) (0.52) (0.21) 
Rvolt 2.6438 3.9556 6.1679** 3.1323 4.8605* 7.0769** 
 (0.86) (1.55) (2.36) (1.00) (1.83) (2.60) 
Constant 0.0486 0.0351 0.0085 0.0458 0.0275 0.0041 
 (0.66) (0.49) (0.12) (0.61) (0.38) (0.06) 
R2 0.2931 0.3595 0.4568 0.3107 0.3979 0.4947 
N 36 36 36 36 36 36 
 
 
 
